Summary
A new study published in Ethnic and Racial Studies offers a fresh way of understanding how Muslim leaders in Europe respond to hostility and suspicion. Sociologist Olav Elgvin from Fafo, an Oslo research institute, spent nearly two decades studying Muslim elites in Norway through 50 in-depth interviews, continuous fieldwork and archival research stretching back to the late 1980s. His conclusion challenges the idea that minority leaders respond to stigma in only one way.
Elgvin identifies three distinct repertoires of action. The first is respectability politics, where leaders try to appear non-threatening and cooperative in order to win acceptance. The second is resistance, where they openly challenge authorities and refuse to soften their positions. The third is refuge, where they withdraw from public engagement entirely and focus on their own communities.
Norway offers an unusual case. Compared with France or the UK, the Norwegian state funds mosques, supports interfaith dialogue and treats Muslim leaders as partners rather than suspects. This relatively supportive environment shaped how Muslim elites behaved. When leaders believed that being respectable would pay off, they chose respectability. When they lost faith in that strategy, they turned to resistance or retreat.
The study traces this arc clearly. In 1989, Muslim leaders organised mass protests against Salman Rushdie’s book. By 1993, a new umbrella organisation, the Islamic Council of Norway, had embraced dialogue and moderation. In the 2010s, a new generation of leaders challenged the state more openly, even hiring a niqab-wearing woman and losing public funding as a result. Today, many former activists describe burnout and have quietly stepped back. Elgvin argues that these three responses form a continuum, not a hierarchy. The key variable is simple: whether actors believe acceptance is genuinely possible.
A Small Country With a Distinctive Approach
Norway is not the first country that comes to mind when discussing Islam in Europe. Its Muslim population is relatively small, and its history of Muslim immigration began later than in Britain or France. Yet according to Olav Elgvin, this small Nordic nation offers a uniquely revealing case study. Norway has maintained what he calls a relatively supportive and liberal policy toward religious minorities, including mosques. The state funds religious communities proportionally to their membership, a legacy of Norway’s history with independent churches. Interfaith dialogue enjoys strong institutional support through the Council for Religious and Life Stance Communities, established in 1996.
This context matters enormously. In France, Muslim leaders often operate under suspicion. In the UK, counterterrorism policies cast a long shadow. In Norway, politicians visit mosques before elections. They attend Muslim holidays. They engage with imams as partners. The atmosphere is not free of scepticism, and Norwegian politicians have publicly criticised Muslim leaders on issues like women’s rights and homosexuality. Nevertheless, the level of public recognition is notably higher than in most Western European countries.
Elgvin’s research asks a simple question. How do Muslim elites respond when they face domination, even in a comparatively friendly environment? His answer reveals a dynamic landscape shaped by one central calculation: whether respectability actually delivers results.
Three Ways to Respond to Power
Elgvin’s conceptual framework distinguishes three repertoires of action. Respectability politics, a concept borrowed from research on Black social movements in the United States, describes behaviour aimed at appearing non-controversial and non-threatening. Resistance politics involves openly challenging authorities and refusing to conform. Refuge politics means withdrawing from engagement and seeking security within one’s own community.
These are not fixed personality types. The same individuals and organisations move between them over time. What drives the shifts, Elgvin argues, is the perception of whether acceptance is achievable. When leaders believe respectability will be rewarded, they pursue it. When they conclude that neither respectability nor resistance will work, they retreat into refuge.
The framework is relational. It only makes sense in contexts of domination and exclusion. Respectability politics, resistance and refuge all represent different ways of responding to a dominating power. Elgvin illustrates this with three simple phrases. Respectability says: “We are not as bad as you think.” Refuge says: “We remove ourselves from your reach.” Resistance says: “We defy your power over us.”
| Repertoire | Core Message | Typical Behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| Respectability | “We are not as bad as you think” | Dialogue, moderation, coalition building |
| Resistance | “We defy your power over us” | Confrontation, independence, open criticism |
| Refuge | “We remove ourselves from your reach” | Withdrawal, community focus, disengagement |
From Protest to Partnership
The history of Muslim elites in Norway begins with confrontation. In 1989, during the Rushdie affair, an ad hoc body called the Islamic Defence Council coordinated protests across the country. A demonstration in Oslo drew nearly 3,000 participants, remarkable given that Norway then hosted only about 40,000 people from Muslim-majority countries. Demonstrators carried slogans like “Stop Satan Rushdie.” The Council pursued legal action against the publisher. This was clearly not respectability politics.
Just a few years later, the atmosphere shifted. In 1992, the Church of Norway invited mosques to establish formal dialogue. By October 1993, the Islamic Council of Norway (IRN) was founded. From the start, IRN emphasised dialogue, coalition building and moderation. When Church partners wanted to discuss the Rushdie controversy, IRN made clear it wanted to move on. During debates about compulsory Christianity instruction in schools, IRN joined forces with the Jewish Community and the Humanist Association. The IRN leader and the chief rabbi publicly called each other “brothers.”
This was textbook respectability politics. One former IRN leader explained his approach candidly. In dialogue and contact with authorities, you look for common ground. You do not talk about controversial issues unless asked. You show the “real Islam,” not the bad image from media. In internal meetings, IRN representatives even argued that Muslims were not discriminated against in Norway, a position that became increasingly difficult to defend.
When Respectability Stops Paying
The strategy appeared to work. In 2007, IRN began receiving public funding. The backdrop was the Muhammad cartoons controversy of 2006. IRN representatives travelled to Pakistan and the Middle East, arguing that Norway should not be boycotted. Politicians rewarded this constructive stance. Throughout these years, Norwegian governance of Islam remained comparatively lenient. Proposals to ban the hijab or halt mosque construction never entered the political mainstream.
Yet by the 2010s, the approach changed. New leaders took over IRN with a different philosophy. They believed mainstream society had grown more sceptical and that Muslim organisations needed to build strength from within. They launched the “Safe Muslim” initiative, an insurance fund offering legal help to Muslims facing discrimination. They diversified funding through halal certification, reducing dependence on the state. More importantly, they began openly challenging authorities.
When criticised for not doing enough to combat radicalisation, IRN went on the offensive, arguing that Islamophobia was the more pressing issue. This strident attitude annoyed politicians, some of whom discussed cutting funding. In 2017, IRN hired a woman who wore the niqab. The public outcry was enormous. IRN lost its public funding. A significant portion of the organisation broke away and formed a competing umbrella group, the Muslim Dialogue Network, which soon became the authorities’ preferred partner.
The resistance strategy had backfired. As one new IRN leader later reflected, bringing a lawyer to a meeting with a government minister showed a fundamental misunderstanding of Norwegian politics. The minister held all the power. The only way to achieve anything was to find common ground.
| Period | Dominant Repertoire | Key Development |
|---|---|---|
| Late 1980s | Resistance | Rushdie protests, Islamic Defence Council |
| Early 1990s | Respectability | IRN founded, dialogue with Church |
| 2000s | Respectability | Public funding secured after cartoon crisis |
| 2010s | Resistance | Niqab hiring, funding lost |
| 2020s | Refuge and pragmatism | Burnout, partial return to dialogue |
The Quiet Retreat
Beyond respectability and resistance lies a third path: refuge. Elgvin found that many Muslim leaders who had once engaged publicly eventually withdrew. Some described burnout and depression. One former IRN leader recalled looking at photographs of himself from that period. He looked terribly serious, always on the defensive, exhausted. He stepped down and cried at home. It took him a decade to recover. He promised himself never again to take a representative role as a Muslim.
His metaphor is striking. Everyone needs a ticket to ride the subway. But as a Muslim representative, he felt he had to wave that ticket constantly, up and down, proving again and again that he belonged. That constant suspicion exacted a psychological toll.
The politics of refuge also operates at the organisational level. A leader of a Salafi-inspired youth organisation explained that his group had tried both fighting back and being soft. Neither worked. People kept coming at them regardless. So they decided to stay out of the public eye, doing their own work quietly. This is not active resistance. It is deliberate disengagement, a search for safety within one’s own moral community.
Why This Matters Beyond Norway
Elgvin’s framework travels well. Similar patterns appear in studies of Muslims in France, Belgium, Switzerland and Canada. Everywhere, minority leaders face the same fundamental question: is acceptance possible? The answer shapes strategy. In hostile environments, refuge and resistance become more attractive. In supportive environments, respectability can flourish.
The Norwegian case suggests that state policy matters. When authorities treat Muslim leaders as legitimate partners, they create incentives for moderation and cooperation. When they treat them as suspects, they push them toward withdrawal or defiance. The implications for European policymakers are significant. Integration is not simply a matter of Muslim communities changing. It depends equally on whether states offer genuine pathways to acceptance.
Elgvin is careful to note that Muslim elites are not simply victims. They can dominate others within their own communities, including women, sexual minorities and youth. Power operates in multiple directions. Nevertheless, his research shows that even in a comparatively friendly country, Muslim leaders feel the weight of suspicion. Their responses, whether respectability, resistance or refuge, deserve to be understood rather than judged.
